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Adjudication of Things Past: Reflections
on History as Evidence
by
DANIEL A. FARBER*
We cannot invent our facts. Either Elvis Presley is dead or he isn't.
-Eric Hobsbawm
1
"Evidence, like clue or proof, is a crucial word for the historian
and the judge."' So we are told by Carlo Ginzburg, a leading histori-
ographer who has traced comparisons between the roles of the judge
and historian over the past two centuries. Today, he advises us,
words like proof and truth have acquired an unfashionable ring in the
social sciences.' But skepticism about these concepts has not yet be-
come universal. Despite an awareness that historical perspectives
themselves change over time, Ginzburg himself is not prepared to
"abandon the concept of truth. He analogizes the shifting perspectives
of historians to linguistic change: "[n]either the past and future de-
velopments of the language we speak, nor the existence of other lan-
* Associate Dean for Faculty and Research and Henry J. Fletcher Professor of
Law, University of Minnesota. Carol Chomsky, Sharon Reich, and especially Roger C.
Park provided particular assistance during the preparation of this Article. I would also
like to thank Suzanna Sherry, Gerald Torres, and Dianne Farber for their comments on
drafts, and Jeanette Arazi for her research assistance. A preliminary version of this essay
appeared under the title History as Evidence in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST WORLD
CONFERENCE ON NEW TRENDS IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION AND EVIDENCE (J.F. Ni-
jboer & J.M. Reijntjes eds., 1997).
1. Eric Hobsbawm, The New Threat to History, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Dec. 16, 1993, at
62-63.
2. Carlo Ginzburg, Checking the Evidence: The Judge and the Historian, in JAMES
CHANDLER ET AL., QUESTIONS OF EVIDENCE: PROOF, PRACTICE, AND PERSUASION
ACROSS THE DISCIPLINES 290 (1994) [hereinafter QUESTIONS OF EVIDENCE]. For recent
discussions of this comparison by legal scholars, see Ronald Allen, The Nature of Juridical
Proof, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 373, 387-91 (1991); WILLIAM TWINING, RETHINKING
EVIDENCE: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 71-81 (1990).
3. See Ginzburg, supra note 2, at 294.
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guages, affect our commitment to the language we speak or its grip
over reality."4 But Ginzburg is considered suspect in many quarters.
As a defender of evidence, truth, and proof, he is said to be "just a
conservative positivist."5 That criticism was sparked by Ginzburg's
view that Holocaust denial is flatly false, not merely a politically inef-
fectual version of the world.6
The implication of such debates for the legal process has not
gone unnoticed. As Mirjan Damagka has pointed out, trials have
conventionally been considered a form of inquiry into past events,
with the underlying assumption of "some kind of correlation between
our statements about the world and the world itself."' But
"[i]nfluential currents of contemporary thought posit a radical dis-
junction of language from external reference: to ascribe to words the
capacity to represent reality-no matter how constructed-is
branded a vulgar illusion."8 Yet, he observes, "[w]here 'the covenant
between word and world' is broken, it makes no sense to worry about
accuracy in fact-finding or about judgments that fail to reflect the
truth."9 Postmodernism, then, puts into question the entire function
of the trial as traditionally understood.
However their tasks may differ,"° both the judge and the histo-
rian have traditionally defined their roles on the basis of concepts
like evidence, proof, and truth. Whatever else may be said on the
subject, these concepts can no longer be taken for granted. Distinc-
tions between objectivity and ideology, and between advocacy and
scholarship, are now highly contested and problematic. It would be
presumptuous to attempt to resolve such fundamental issues in this
essay. Instead, my goal is to investigate the relationship between this
dispute and historical and judicial practice. To provide concreteness
to this inquiry, I will take as a point of departure the literal intersec-
tion between law and history that occurs when historians enter the
4. Id. at 303.
5. Arnold I. Davidson, Carlo Ginzburg and the Renewal of Historiography. in
QUESTIONS OF EVIDENCE, supra note 2, at 311. Davidson reports, but does not share,
Ginzburg's view.
6. Id. at 309-11.
7. MIRJAN R. DAMA KA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 94(1997).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 95.
10. For a discussion of some of the differences, see Henry Hart & John McNaughton.
Evidence and Inference in the Law, in EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE 50-59 (Daniel Lerner
ed., 1959). Some resemblances between the two tasks are discussed by Judge Frank in In
re Fried, 161 F.2d 453, 462-63 (2d Cir. 1947).
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legal arena to testify as expert witnesses. It bears emphasis, however,
that the situation of the historian witness is being used for illustrative
purposes; this is not fundamentally a paper about the law pertaining
to expert witnesses.
The essay begins by recounting the experiences of historians as
expert witnesses in some notable recent cases." The historian's claim
to be heard is based on expertise, which presumably means height-
ened access to the kind of truth sought in the trial process. Rather
than being accepted as objective, however, the testimony is often
prone to be attacked as politically slanted, as we will see in Part I.
Part II surveys challenges to the politics/scholarship distinction, or in
other words, the arguments against Ginzburg's effort to keep truth,
proof, and evidence in circulation as valid intellectual currency.
These challenges are associated with postmodernism generally, and
in particular with feminist and multiculturalist perspectives on history
and law. Part III argues, however, that abandoning objectivity as a
social ideal would entail serious losses both in law and in history.
This essay covers some seemingly disparate topics: recent con-
troversies over testimony by historians in politically charged cases;
postmodem theories in law; the "objectivity question" in history; and
efforts to make catharsis or public education, rather than truth-
seeking, central to the trial process. The common thread, however, is
the question of fidelity to the past.12 The historian's fidelity is threat-
ened by the pressures of trial. The postmodern legal scholar and the
relativist historian question the very possibility of keeping faith with
the past. The evidence law revisionist wants to replace historic truth
with some more present-oriented goal. Although seeking the truth
about the past is often more complex and sometimes more disturbing
than we like to admit, it is a search we cannot afford to abandon.
I. Historians in Court
An expert witness is always under pressure to simplify and recast
her views for advocacy purposes. The deeper question confronted by
11. A related development is the use of social science findings in judicial opinions.
See David Faigman, "Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding": Exploring the Empirical
Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 541 (1991).
12. The concept of creative fidelity to the past has recently gained attention in con-
stitutional theory. See, e.g., Symposium, Fidelity in Constitutional Theory, 65 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1247 (1997); Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez,
1995 Sup. Cr. REv. 125.
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the historian is the extent to which these pressures are really distin-
guishable from the professional and ideological pressures operating
in her "normal" professional life. By putting the historian's profes-
sional role under stress, the courtroom highlights some of the ten-
sions internal to that role.
The role of historians as expert witnesses is illustrated by a re-
cent case from Minnesota involving Native American hunting and
fishing rights. 3 An 1837 treaty provided that hunting and fishing
rights were "guaranteed to the Indians, during the pleasure of the
President of the United States."14 A later presidential order pur-
ported to revoke these rights. The Chippewa argued that the 1837
treaty should be interpreted to allow revocation only for misconduct,
which is how they contended the Native Americans who signed the
treaty would have understood it. Other issues in the case involved
the implementation of the treaty during the nineteenth century.
The critical role played by historians in the trial can best be seen
in the trial judge's summary of the evidence. She relied heavily on
the plaintiff's five expert witnesses,"5 and the defense also called five
similar experts, including a specialist in Minnesota history and a spe-
cialist on the role of railroads in western expansion. Thirty pages of
the court's opinion in the Chippewa case are devoted to historical
findings. The expert witnesses played a crucial role in the critical
finding:
Dodge [the government negotiator] did not explain the phrase "at
the pleasure of the President" to the Chippewa, and the testimony
of Dr. Nichols established that the Chippewa would not have un-
derstood "at the pleasure of the President" to give him unrestricted
discretion. The State argues that the traders, half-breeds, and mis-
sionaries at the treaty negotiations would have supplemented the
official translations and ensured that the Chippewa understood all
of the provisions of the treaty. Dr. Cleland testified persuasively,
however, that all of these groups had their own interests to protect
and that those interests were not identical with the interests of the
13. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 861 F. Supp. 784 (D. Minn.
1994), affid 124 F.3d 904 (8th Cir. 1997). For some other examples of the use of historians
as expert witnesses in litigation involving Native American treaty rights, see Pueblo de
Zia v. United States, 165 Ct. Cl. 501 (1964); Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Baca, 844 F.2d 708.
710-12 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v. Dupris, 612 F.2d 319, 338-39 (8th Cir. 1979).
14. Cited in Mille Lacs Band, 861 F. Supp. at 789.
15. Id.
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Chippewa. 1
6
Hence, the court concluded, the revocation of the 1837 treaty
was ineffective, the fishing and hunting rights of the tribe remained
intact, and the state government was not entitled to regulate them. 17
A. The Historian as Expert Witness
As the Chippewa case illustrates, there is a growing trend in
American trials toward the widespread use of expert witnesses on a
wide range of issues, including historical matters. The use of histori-
ans as expert witnesses is not unusual today in several categories of
cases, such as those involving deportation of alleged Holocaust par-
ticipants" and those involving claims of discriminatory intent under
the Voting Rights Act. 9
Although the Chippewa case was locally controversial, it did not
directly involve any major issue of national social policy. As we will
see, historians have also been involved in litigation involving some of
the leading social issues of our day, particularly issues relating to
gender and sexuality. Those cases dramatize the challenges to the
historian's claim to offer the court a source of reliable, objective evi-
dence.
B. Ideology and Professionalism: Discrimination Law
The dispute over objectivity arose in vivid form in a recent chal-
lenge to a state constitutional amendment negating gay rights." One
peripheral question was the extent to which anti-homosexual norms
are embedded in our cultural traditions, and particularly the extent to
16. Id. at 827. Nichols was a linguist, while Cleland was an ethnohistorian. See id. at
790.
17. See id. at 838-39, 841.
18. See, e.g., Kalejs v. INS, 10 F.3d 441, 443 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Dailide,
953 F. Supp. 192, 196 n.4 (N.D. Ohio 1997); United States v. Lileikis, 929 F. Supp. 31, 37
(D. Mass. 1996); United States v. Koziy, 540 F. Supp. 25, 27 (S.D. Fla. 1982); United
States v. Linnas, 527 F. Supp. 426,430 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
19. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229 (1985); NAACP v. City of Ni-
agara Falls, 65 F.3d 1002, 1020 (2d Cir. 1995); Irby v. Fitz-Hugh, 692 F. Supp. 610, 613
(E.D. Va. 1988). See also J. Morgan Kousser, Expert Witnesses, Rational Choice and the
Search for Intent, 5 CONST. CoMM. 349 (1988). If the evidence is solely addressed to a
discussion of past social developments, it need not be presented in the form of oral testi-
mony, but as we will see, this is not uncommon.
20. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
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which they are severable from Christian theology. Professor Martha
Nussbaum testified at trial about the classical Greek view on the
subject, focusing on Plato.2 She became locked in a fierce dispute
with another expert witness, John Finnis, over the meaning of some
critical passages from Plato. In particular, the two crossed swords
over whether a particular Greek phrase is best translated as "those
who first ventured to do this" or "those who were first guilty of such
enormities," with the difference turning on the meaning of a single
Greek word.2
This dispute fortunately did not turn out to be relevant to the
Supreme Court's decision, but what it lacked in legal significance it
made up for in contentiousness. Both combatants later published ar-
ticles on the subject. A couple of selected sentences will communi-
cate the flavor of Finnis's comments: "Not surprisingly, the falsifica-
tion to which the works of Dover, Vlastos, and Price were subjected
was extended to some of Professor Nussbaum's own earlier writ-
ings."23 And the following:
So Professor Nussbaum put a dictionary before the court precisely
as 'the authoritative dictionary relied on by all scholars in this area,'
but the quotation that, she said, was from that dictionary is in fact
from one that is not authoritative or relied upon by all scholars, or
indeed any scholars.
24
In conclusion, Finnis said, Nussbaum's testimony was "a wholesale
abuse of her scholarly authority and attainments."'
Nussbaum also published an article on the subject of her testi-
mony, but adopted the more constructive strategy of burying her op-
ponent in citations rather than invective. Although her rhetoric was
more restrained than Finnis's, she added an entire appendix disputing
his views, another appendix about tools of classical scholarship at
least partly devoted to attacking his choice of dictionaries,26 and yet
another suggesting strategies for lawyers to prove the incompetence
of opposing experts. Indeed, she described Finnis's views as the focal
point of this 130 page article.27 Although she stopped short of draw-
21. See Martha Nussbaum, Platonic Love and Colorado Law: The Relevance of An-
cient Greek Norms to Modern Sexual Controversies, 80 VA. L. REV. 1515. 1518 (1994).
22. John Finnis, "Shameless Acts" in Colorado: Abuse of Scholarship in Constitu-
tional Cases, ACAD. QUESTIONS, Fall 1994, at 10, 23.
23. Id. at 31.
24. Id. at 25-26.
25. Id. at 35.
26. Nussbaum, supra note 21, at 1620-22.
27. Id. at 1554.
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ing the connection, she emphasized aspects of Finnis's views that cor-
respond with Catholic doctrine,2 8 leaving the implication that his his-
torical interpretations were distorted by his Christian religious com-
mitments, as she believed Western attitudes toward homosexuals
generally have been distorted.
The Finnis/Nussbaum dispute pales in comparison to the clash
in an earlier discrimination case, EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.29
There, the clash had expanded beyond two conflicting historians to
embrace a significant segment of the historical profession itself.
Sears was a massive sex discrimination case, in which the government
had relied entirely on statistical evidence to demonstrate widespread
intentional discrimination against women. Sears argued that because
the jobs in question involved job stress and financial risk, women
were less likely to apply, thus explaining any statistical disparity in
hiring.3" In support of this theory, Sears called Rosalind Rosenberg
to testify about the history of women's attitudes toward the work-
place.31
Rosenberg testified that traditionally women have been social-
ized not to seek risky or stressful employment such as that involved
in the case. The government responded with the testimony of an-
other women's historian, Alice Kessler-Harris.32 She testified that
any disparity in hiring was probably due to discrimination by Sears
rather than any gender difference in job interests; her testimony
seemed somewhat at odds, however, with some previous writings
about women in the workplace.33 As she reported later, Kessler-
Harris was particularly offended by Rosenberg's rebuttal testimony:
Rosenberg attacked my credibility (on which she had earlier relied
in her own testimony) by claiming that what I said on the stand con-
tradicted my own published work. She did so by suggesting that my
28. lML at 1525-29. See esp. id. at 1527 n.37.
29. 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988).
30. For an explanation of the statistical issues, see Thomas Haskell & Sanford Levin-
son, Academic Freedom and Expert Witnessing: Historians and the Sears Case, 66 TEx. L.
REV. 1620, 1636-48 (1988).
31. Rosenberg has been called the author of the most original and sophisticated his-
torical work on women's culture. See PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE
"OBJECTIVITY QUESTION" AND THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION 500-01
(1988).
32. Her perspective on the case can be found in Alice Kessler-Harris, Academic
Freedom and Expert Witnessing: A Response to Haskell and Levinson, 67 TEx. L. REV.
429 (1988).
33. See NOVICK, supra note 31, at 504.
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testimony was infused with a particular political perspective and by
citing selective examples from my work that purported to demon-
strate contradictions between the two bodies of material.34
Seemingly sharing Kessler-Harris's reaction, the leading American
academic journal of feminism published an "archive" on the case that
deleted Rosenberg's rebuttal.35
Although the judge credited Rosenberg's testimony, professional
reaction against her was swift and devastating. At a meeting of 150
feminist scholars at Columbia, no one defended her against charges
of attacking working women and undermining sexual equality.36 A
committee of female historians passed a resolution declaring that "as
feminist scholars we have a responsibility not to allow our scholarship
to be used against the interests of women struggling for equity in our
society., 37 The entire controversy seemed designed, according to two
liberal commentators, "to insure that no other historian, especially
one without tenure, ever will dare to express similar views in court or
in any other forum.,
38
The Sears case raises important questions about the relationship
between historical scholarship and politics. The crux of the attack on
Rosenberg was that her testimony was politically harmful, and by
implication, politically motivated, while her defenders charged that it
was the attackers who were politically motivated. This dispute cer-
tainly highlighted, though it did little to answer, the question of how
(or whether) ideological advocacy can be distinguished from scholar-
ship.
As one commentator observes,39 something of a reprise of the
Sears litigation took place in United States v. Virginia.4 ° The issue in
that case was whether the state could create a girls' school as a rem-
edy for having excluded them from a military academy, or whether
the only permissible remedy was to make the existing academy
coed. 4' One of the state's primary witnesses was Elizabeth Fox-
34. Kessler-Harris, supra note 32, at 430.
35. See Haskell & Levinson, supra note 30, at 1636.
36. See NOVICK, supra note 31, at 509.
37. See Haskell & Levinson, supra note 30, at 1631.
38. Id. at 1630.
39. See Diane Avery, Institutional Myths, Historical Narratives and Social Science
Evidence: Reading the "Record" in the Virginia Military Institute Case, 5 So. CAL. REV. L.
& WOMEN'S STUD. 189,290 (1996).
40. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
41. Id. at 547-51.
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Genovese, a leading feminist historian, who testified that gender-
based differences in learning styles favored the use of single-sex edu-
cation in this setting.42 Fox-Genovese had previously commented
that Rosenberg's testimony in Sears was "wonderfully revealing" be-
cause it had followed certain feminist premises to their logical con-
clusion.43 Unlike Rosenberg, however, Fox-Genovese seemingly
avoided the ire of her fellow feminists. Perhaps the reason was that
the issue was not whether discrimination took place but rather the
appropriate remedy-an issue described by one feminist commenta-
tor as one "about which feminists and legal scholars reasonably could
and did disagree."'  While crediting her testimony, the trial judge
was skeptical of the testimony of the government's expert witnesses,
whose "personal beliefs in a political and legal notion of equality that
discounted the significance of gender differences... was used to dis-
credit their testimony about their specific research findings and to
question the reliability of their professional judgment generally."'45
Thus, the issue of advocacy versus scholarship surfaced again, though
in milder form.
C. Advocacy and Scholarship: Abortion Law
A feminist historian at Stanford, who was asked to contribute
to a pro-choice brief in an abortion case, reported "a small but nag-
ging fear" stemming from the chilling effect of the Sears case.46 Nev-
ertheless, along with 280 other historians, she signed the brief.47 The
thrust of this amicus brief was that historically, abortion was forbid-
den only for medical reasons rather than protection of the fetus.
The Stanford historian's fears would not have been assuaged if
she had known the reactions of John Finnis, Nussbaum's antagonist
in the gay rights case. Finnis was no more complimentary toward the
abortion brief than he had been to Nussbaum's testimony. In par-
ticular, Finnis was harshly critical of James Mohr, whose historical re-
search provided the foundation of the brief. According to Finnis,
Mohr's book on the subject "squarely contradicts" the conclusion in
42. See Avery, supra note 39, at 277, 282.
43. See id. at 282.
44. hd at 283.
45. Ld. at 280.
46. Estelle B. Freedman, Historical Interpretation and Legal Advocacy: Rethinking
the Webster Amicus Brief, PUB. HISTORIAN, Summer 1990, at 27.
47. The brief is reprinted at PUB. HISTORIAN, Summer 1990, at 57.
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the brief; in subscribing to the brief, Mohr was "grossly misrepre-
senting his own scholarly findings., 48  For instance, Finnis quotes
Mohr's earlier work as saying that much of the support for abortion
restrictions originally came from doctors, who defended the value of
human life as an absolute: "And once they had decided that human
life was present to some extent in a newly fertilized ovum, however
limited that extent might be, they became the fierce opponents of any
attack upon it. ' ' 49 Yet the amicus brief portrayed the motivation of
the doctors as unrelated to fetal protection. In short, Finnis writes,
"the production of and submission of the Brief was, in my opinion, a
fraud on the Court and the nation."5°
Some of Finnis's concerns were actually shared to an extent by
those who had drafted and signed the brief. For example, they were
troubled by the brief's failure to mention the fact that many nine-
teenth-century feminists opposed abortion.5' Mohr himself seems to
have been particularly concerned about the gap between the brief
and his own conception of scholarship:
In contrast to lawyers, most historians, at least the ones whom I
have most admired, try to explore as many aspects of their subject
as they can, even where they have clear assumptions upon which
they work, overt axes to grind, and open political agendas. They
take complexity, ambiguity and paradox as givens and they tease
from the past those interpretations that seem compelling to them in
the present; but unlike the lawyer, the historians I have most ad-
mired take seriously and openly into account alternative explana-
tions, mixed motives, and inconvenient facts.
52
Although he signed the brief because it was closer to his view of
history than the historical arguments of the other side, Mohr consid-
ered it be a "legal argument based on historical evidence. Ulti-
mately, it was a political document."53 He did not "ultimately con-
sider the brief to be history, as I understand that craft.
54
In a thoughtful commentary addressing Mohr's concerns, two of
48. Finnis, supra note 22, at 13.
49. Id. at 17.
50. Id. at 18. The traditions of British understatement and Oxford urbanity have not.
one gathers, survived into the post-Thatcher era.
51. See Jane E. Larson & Clyde Spillenger, "That's Not History": The Boundaries of
Advocacy and Scholarship, 12 PUB. HISTORIAN 33, 39 (Summer 1990).
52. James C. Mohr, Historically Based Legal Briefs: Observations of a Participant in
the Webster Process, 12 PUB. HISTORIAN 19, 21-22 (Summer 1990).
53. Id. at 25.
54. Id.
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the brief's drafters questioned the distinction between advocacy and
scholarship. "To rest one's criticism of a work solely on the claim
that it is 'partisan' or 'ideological' or 'advocative' is to remain inno-
cent of social theories of knowledge."55 In the drafters' view, any
claim of true objectivity or neutrality was suspect, because all knowl-
edge is socially shaped and therefore political. They concluded that
the "distinction between advocative and objective scholarship be-
comes difficult to maintain," appearing "increasingly like one of nu-
ance-a question of who can appear less obvious, or more subtle, in
her rhetoric."56 This sounds like, but was not, a defense of purely po-
litical scholarship. For they went on to say that in practice, objectiv-
ity is less an epistemological position than a demand for "something a
bit more humble-such as fairness and credibility."57 They agreed
with Mohr's vision of the moral responsibilities of good scholarship,
including a vision of truth which embodies complexity, ambiguity and
paradox. In particular, they said, the scholar should allow "truths
that conflict with one's politics to enter into and shape the conclu-
sions of one's work."58 Nevertheless, they continued, historians must
be prepared to translate their views into the cruder language of poli-
tics when they enter public debate-including, it would seem, when
entering the courthouse. 9
One of the most striking aspects of the historians' brief was the
enormous credibility it obtained from the public, including abortion
opponents.6° That public reception was presumably based on a per-
ception that the brief was not merely special pleading but had some
kind of objective credibility.
II. Putting "Truth" on Trial
Although doubts about the meaning and even existence of objec-
tivity are highlighted when historians enter the arena of the court-
room, the issues are obviously much broader and more fundamental.
For the lawyer, the question is whether the litigation process can
claim the goal of establishing truth. For the historian, the question is
55. Larson & Spillenger, supra note 51, at 37.
56. See iL at 38.
57. See id.
58. Ia- at 39.
59. See id. at 43.
60. See id. at 40 n.19 (citing George Will, a noted conservative columnist, who ac-
cepted the briefs historical account).
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whether scholarship can be distinguished from advocacy, or objectiv-
ity from ideology. I begin by considering some wholesale recent at-
tacks by legal scholars on the concept of objective truth, before re-
turning to the issue of objectivity in historical research.
A. The Postmodern Challenge
Challenges to the concept of objectivity span the disciplines.
Among legal scholars, the attack on objectivity stems from members
of three interlinked groups: critical legal scholars, critical race theo-
rists, and radical feminists.61 Gary Peller, a leading critical legal
scholar, has explained that broader attacks on current social stan-
dards are grounded on the "critique of objectivity and liberal notions
of knowledge pressed by radical feminists and critical race theo-
rists. " ' Generally speaking, this critique associates objectivity with
structures of social oppression.
Among radical feminists, objectivity is sometimes seen as part of
the apparatus maintaining the subordination of women. While
avowing to be neutral and universal, they argue, objectivity in fact
embodies the male perspective. For example, Catharine MacKinnon
disavows what she calls "standard scientific norms."'63 She explains
that the radical feminist critique of "the objective standpoint as
male" is necessarily "a critique of science as a specifically male ap-
proach to knowledge."' To look at women objectively is to objectify
them, to treat them as objects. More generally, "[o]bjectivity is the
epistemological stance of which objectification is the social process
.... That is, to look at the world objectively is to objectify it."65
Radical feminists have called for a repudiation of the ideals of
objectivism and rationalism propounded by traditional scholars.'
61. For an overview and critique, see DANIEL FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY.
BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL ATTACK ON TRUTH IN LAW (1997).
62. See Gary Peller, The Discourse of Constitutional Degradation, 81 GEO. L.J. 313.
339 (1992).
63. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON
LIFE AND LAW 54 (1987).
64. See id.
65. Id. at 50.
66. See Susan H. Williams, Feminist Legal Epistemology, 8 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J.
63, 71 (1993). For a discussion of the epistemological issues by a feminist male scholar,
see Peter Halewood, White Men Can't Jump: Critical Epistemologies, Embodiment, and
the Praxis of Legal Scholarship, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (1995). He suggests that male
scholars should retract their views whenever feminist women disagree. See id. at 25. For
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For example, in critiquing traditional legal pedagogy, Linda
Hirshman attacks the current "orthodoxy about what counts as
knowledge" because it "enshrine[s] a private order of male domi-
nance." 67 Similarly, Lucinda Finley contends that "objective think-
ing is male language," as are "[r]ationality, abstraction, [and] a pref-
erence for statistical and empirical proofs over experiential or
anecdotal evidence."'68 Although addressed at scholarship, historical
or otherwise, this position has obvious implications about claims that
objective truth is the goal of trials.
For some minority scholars, a similar critique of conventional ra-
tionality is rooted in multiculturalism. Gary Peller explains the rejec-
tion of objectivism by black nationalist scholars:
In general, the radical critique launched by black nationalist soci-
ologists and cultural critics claimed that objective reason or knowl-
edge could not exist, because one's position in the social structure
of race relations influenced what one would call "knowledge" or
"rationality." The cultural differences between blacks and whites
could not be studied through a neutral frame of reference, because
any frame of reference assumed the perspective of either the op-
pressed or the oppressor, either African Americans or whites, ei-
ther the sociologist or the subject.... There could be no neutral
theory of knowledge-knowledge was itself a function of the ability
of the powerful to impose their own views, to differentiate between
knowledge and myth, reason and emotion, and objectivity and
subjectivity.69
Others have taken the attack further by challenging not merely truth,
but the entire normative structure of current society.7 °
The erosion of the concept of objectivity opens the door for what
would previously have been considered unduly subjective approaches
to scholarship. Methodologically, the rejection of traditional con-
a more recent epistemological debate, see Susan Hekman's Truth and Method" Feminist
Standpoint Theory Revisited, 22 SIGNS 341 (1997), along with the rejoinders in the same
issue by other feminist scholars.
67. See Linda R. Hirshman, Foreword: The Waning of the Middle Age, 69 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 293,297-98 (1993).
68. See Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the
Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886, 893 (1989).
69. Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758,806.
70. According to Richard Delgado, a leading critical race theorist, "[n]ormative or-
derings always reflect the views of the powerful"; hence, "one cannot use categories like
justice, equality, etc., to overturn the very system" that created those values. See Richard
Delgado, Norms and Normal Science: Toward a Critique of Normativity in Legal Thought,
139 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 951, 961 (1991).
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cepts has led to a novel technique in scholarship: the presentation of
stories based on personal experience. By 1989, legal storytelling had
risen to such prominence that it warranted a symposium in a major
law review.7 ' A classic example is Patricia Williams' "Benetton"
story about how she was refused admission to a store for (she be-
lieves) racial reasons, and the difficulties she encountered in per-
suading a law review to publish her unsupported account of this epi-
sode.72 Use of narrative or case studies is hardly new to scholarship,
whether historical or legal. But the legal storytellers value only "sto-
ries from the bottom" about oppression.73 They de-emphasize tradi-
tional analytic methods, seem relatively unconcerned about whether
stories are either typical or descriptively accurate, and emphasize the
aesthetic and emotional dimensions of narration.74
The tension between legal storytelling and traditional concepts
of objectivity can be seen in the writings of some of its most thought-
ful advocates. Discussing narratives that are presented as factual,
Kathryn Abrams finds it untroubling if these narratives were to turn
out "not [to] track the life experiences of their narrators in all par-
ticulars" or to be composites of multiple events.'5 After all, she points
out, creating a narrative inevitably involves a process of selection and
modification. 6 Jane Baron questions the continuing, if ambivalent.
attachment of storytellers to the traditional concept of an objective
reality, a concept she believes to be at odds with the implications of
their methodology.77 Another defender of legal storytelling, Bill Esk-
ridge, suggests that building community among the oppressed-not
discovering objective truth-may be the highest goal of legal scholar-
ship. 8 None of this fits readily with the conventional views of the na-
ture or goals of scholarship.
Legal storytelling is essentially testimony offered without the
possibility of impeachment, cross-examination, or contradiction by
71. See Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989).
72. See PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 44-51 (1991).
73. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 61, at 38-40.
74. Id.
75. See Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971. 1025
(1991).
76. See id. at 1026.
77. See Jane B. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 255 (1994). For a
more recent discussion, see Jane B. Baron & Julie Epstein, Is Law Narrative?, 45 BUFF.
L. REV. 141, 183-84, 186 (1997).
78. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 607, 625
(1994).
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other witnesses, seeking to be credited based on the narrator's status
as a representative of the oppressed. If this methodology is valid in
legal scholarship, similar issues may arise about how historians
should handle their own source materials-in particular, whether the
stories of the oppressed should be given unquestioned priority over
other historical materials. Similarly, the traditional methods of trial
might be called into question on the theory that they fail to give suffi-
cient credence to certain perspectives.
The connection between these critiques of legal scholarship and
the study of history has not escaped legal scholars. Kim Lane Schep-
pele observes that historical reconstruction, like that taking place in
courts, often proceeds from narrative evidence, and even physical
evidence makes sense primarily in the context of narratives.79 What
"passes for fact, both in historical research and in courts of law," is a
narrative that provides a "sense of faithfulness" to the documentary
narratives on which it is based.8" Apparently, the best for which one
can hope is to "credibly claim to be constructing a narrative of evi-
dence one has not invented out of one's imagination."8 Not every-
thing goes---"it is crucially important to screen out lies"-but reality
comes in multiple, and very different, versions.8
Something remains of the concept of objectivity here, but per-
haps not much: apparently a narrative need only be sincere (and so
not a "lie"83) and nonhallucinatory (and so "not invented out of one's
imagination"'). Perhaps this is the most that the historian or the
court can ask of their findings, but if so, neither can claim to speak
with much authority. But perhaps that is precisely the point.
B. Historians and the Question of Objectivity
Like legal scholars, historians have hotly debated the concept of
objectivity, a debate that is carefully traced by Peter Novick in a 1988
book, That Noble Dream." Although Novick begins his story much
79. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Just the Facts, Ma'am: Sexualized Violence, Evidentiary
Habits, and the Revision of Truth, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 123, 163 (1992).
80. See id.
81. See icL
82. See id. at 164. Thus, facts are "hardly neutral or natural," and "much misogynis-
tic work is done in the construction of 'reality'." See id at 125-26.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 163.
85. NOVICK, supra note 31. For a more recent overview of the debates over histori-
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earlier, we may usefully start with the 1960s when some black histori-
ans (like the black scholars discussed by Peller) advanced the claim
of a unique perspective.86 Novick reports that feminist scholars have
also provided support for an "unabashedly perspectival" approach, as
they have in law.87 But influences from outside the academic disci-
pline of history were also important. Geertz and other anthropolo-
gists promoted an influential relativist viewpoint.88 (Indeed, even to-
day, anthropologists debate whether witchcraft can be considered
irrational under some cross-cultural standard.89) Another influence
on historians was Foucault, who saw science as propelled by hegem-
ony' and whose philosophical views "historicized and relativized any
stable truth claims."91 Finally, as other commentators have pointed
out, the influence of Derrida also reinforced this trend toward ques-
tioning the possibility of objectively representing reality. 9
For some postmodernists, history seems to collapse into the
study of how historians create texts from other texts.93 Today, post-
modernists often put the word reality in quotes as an ironic state-
ment,94 while science is considered only an elaborate dominance
game to ensure Western power.9 Although the details have varied
from discipline to discipline, this story is familiar to many legal schol-
ars, social scientists, and humanities professors. Postmodernism is a
ubiquitous intellectual presence, even if it sometimes reaches outly-
ing disciplines, such as law, only in simplistic form.
Novick is generally content to provide the details of this history
without editorial comment. In the book's introductory section, how-
ever, he does provide a glimpse of his own views. He contends that
the objectivity concept "promotes an unreal and misleading distinc-
tion between, on the one hand, historical accounts 'distorted' by
cal objectivity, see Joyce Appleby, The Power of History, 103 AM. HIST. REV. 1 (Feb.
1998).
86. See NOVICK, supra note 31, at 490-91.
87. See id. at 596.
88. See id. at 551-52.
89. See id. at 550.
90. See JOYCE APPLEBY ET AL., TELLING THE TRUTH ABOUT HISTORY 203 (1994).
Foucault's own historical methods were slapdash by conventional standards. See
RICHARD HAMILTON, THE SOCIAL MISCONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 171-96 (1996).
91. See APPLEBY ET AL., supra note 90, at 235-36.
92. See id. at 208.
93. See id. at 227.
94. See id. at 204.
95. See NOVICK, supra note 31, at 8.
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ideological assumptions and purposes; on the other hand, history free
of these traits."'  Yet, he agrees that professional methods can mat-
ter more than ideology in at least some historical controversies, so he
is not a complete relativist. 7 The book itself is a model of careful
conventional historical research. As one commentator put it, in No-
vick's "wide-ranging, ironic, dispassionate-indeed, in several senses
of the term objective-account of the American historical profession,
he calls into question precisely those notions of objectivity that lie
hidden in the idea that there is a 'full story."'98
In response to his critics, Novick later attempted to clarify his
views in a paper with the charming title, "My Correct Views on
Everything."'  He considers relativism as less a position in its own
right than a rejection of objectivism."c He also does not view the
dispute about objectivity as having any methodological significance:
If two historians, one a 'nihilist relativist' and the other a dyed-in-
the-wool objectivist, set out to produce a history of the Civil War,
or a biography of George Washington, there is nothing about their'relativism' or 'objectivism' per se that would lead them to do their
research differently, frame their narrative or analysis differently, or,
indeed, prevent their writing identical accounts.10
What, then, is at stake is the understanding of the historian's
function? Are historians engaged in offering new ways of looking at
the past, or should they aspire to a "higher office"-seeking a defini-
tive account?"°2
Novick may have been overly sanguine in stating that nothing
methodological is at stake here. He admitted to being more tolerant
of factual errors than the conventional historian, believing that "an
argument can possess 'relative autonomy.., from details of the evi-
dence.""' 3 For this reason, he expressed sympathy with a graduate
student who was essentially hounded out of the profession because of
numerous (but probably unintentional) errors in his archival research
96. See id. at 6.
97. See id. at 10 (using the example of the profitability of slavery in the American
South).
98. See Allan Megill, AHR Forum: Fragmentation and the Future of Historiography,
96 AM. HMsT. REv. 693, 695 (1991).
99. See id. at 699.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 700.
102. Id. at 702.
103. See id. at 701.
Apr. 1998]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
on the Weimar republic." This nonchalant attitude toward historical
accuracy is reminiscent of the views of the storytelling advocates in
law, although narrative is apparently considered a conservative rather
than radical form in history.5
The ontological question may also have important implications
for how historians address each other's work. As Novick is well
aware, not all his fellow anti-objectivists share his tolerant plural-
ism. °6 As shown by the experiences of historians as expert witnesses,
disputes about controversial historical questions spill over into argu-
ments about ideological motivation and methodological shortcom-
ings. The Rosenberg affair also suggests the possibility that anti-
objectivism can function as an excuse to exert pressure against those
with unpopular views.
In reviewing the anti-objectivist literature, it is important not to
exaggerate. Among historians, attacks on the concept of objectivity
can be easily found. Efforts to "problematize" factuality and reality
are also easy to locate; sometimes these efforts are successful to the
point of leaving the neophyte reader entirely unsure of the author's
conclusions. Nevertheless, objectivity remains an important aspect of
how most historians approach their own work. Historians are un-
likely to abandon entirely their belief in the integrity of the evidence
with which they work. After all, if they abandoned altogether the no-
tion that evidence of the past has some claim to authority, historians
would have no recourse but to join the already overcrowded and of-
ten underpaid ranks of fiction writers. The risk is not a final divorce
between the historian and truth, but a series of infidelities. But this is
not a negligible risk.
As is often true, then, what is really at stake in these debates is a
matter of degree. It is nonetheless an important matter of degree.
To the extent that we blur the distinctions between history and fic-
tion, or between evidence and political testimonials, we may change
the nature of the discourse within the relevant professional communi-
ties. We may also change the way in which those outside of the his-
torical community view its work. As Novick puts it, "[f]rom the
104. NOVICK, supra note 31, at 613-21.
105. See APPLEBY ET AL., supra note 90, at 231-32. It would be a mistake, however,
to reduce the objectivity debate to purely ideological terms. Consider, for example, the
defense of objective scholarship by a leading Marxist historian. See Michael Bess, E.P.
Thompson: The Historian as Activist, 98 AM. HIST. REV. 19, 29-33 (1993).
106. See NOVICK, supra note 31, at 702-03.
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reader's point of view, it's a question of the sort of object they hold in
their hands when they pick up a work of history.""°7 This is an impor-
tant question for many readers, not least of them the judge who is
confronted with a historian's testimony.
M. Objectivity as Value and Process
Regardless of how we define objectivity and characterize the
"reality" of the past, the fundamental question remains: with what
attitude should we approach inquiry into past events?
At first sight, the dispute over objectivity seems epistemological,
that is, to relate to whether and how it is possible to have true knowl-
edge about the past. At least among historians, however, this does
not seem to be the crux of the debate. Even the most postmodern of
historians still admit the existence of some knowable objective
facts-for example, that the Holocaust took place." 8 On the other
hand, even the greatest believer in objective historical truth must
admit that there are limits to historical knowledge. As a practical
matter, there are some events whose true facts will forever remain
debatable because of the ambiguities in the historical record, and
some facts whose import will always be subject to conflicting inter-
pretations. Thus, everyone seems to agree that it is possible to
"know" some things about the past, and that there are other things
that cannot be definitively resolved.
Although postmodernists sometimes speak in such terms, it also
seems to me that the debate cannot be reasonably construed to con-
cern either ontology (is the past "real"?) or semantics (do historical
texts actually "refer" to past events?). As to the ontology question,
the reasons for questioning the reality of the past seem no better than
those for questioning anything else that cannot be currently ob-
served. As to the semantic question, although the whole question of
how words manage to relate to things is full of philosophical myster-
ies, they seem no more profound for past events than current ones.
In short, assuming that Bill Clinton is "real" (though I have never
seen him) and that my use of his name successfully "refers" to a par-
ticular human being, there seems no reason to reach any contrary
conclusions about past figures such as Richard Nixon (whom I also
107. Id. at 700.
108. See ROBERT F. BERKHOFER, JR., BEYOND THE GREAT STORY: HISTORY AS
TEXT AND DISCOURSE 49 (1995); HAYDEN WHITE, THE CONTENT OF THE FORM:
NARRATIVE DISCOURSE AND HISTORICAL REPRESENTATION 76-77 (1987).
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never met) or Franklin Roosevelt (who died before I was born).
Thus, it seems to me, the fundamental dispute is not over the na-
ture of history but over the nature of historians-more specifically,
over the kinds of norms that should govern their work. One post-
modern historian summarizes the existing norms as follows:
Although the very subject matter of history is value loaded, histori-
ans try to construct their histories to be independent of their own
most cherished values or those of their value-loaded sources and
subject matter. Biased histories are condemned as propaganda be-
cause they support or advocate an ideological position or are "pres-
ent-minded" in their interpretations of the past.'
°9
In short, it is important for the traditional historian to open the pos-
sibility that the past might not suit her preconceptions, political or
otherwise, as opposed to exploiting the past as raw material to bolster
a preexisting political position. The postmodernist questions this
stance. As Hayden White says, "[f]or subordinate, emergent, or re-
sisting social groups, this recommendation-that they view history
with the kind of 'objectivity,' 'modesty,' 'realism,' and 'social respon-
sibility' that has characterized historical studies since their establish-
ment as a professional discipline-can only appear as another aspect
of the ideology they are indentured to oppose."
110
The fundamental question, then, seems to be an ethical or politi-
cal one: to what extent is this attitude of "objectivity" desirable?
This question is independent of issues of epistemology or ontology:
even if an objective truth about the past exists, it might be morally
best for historians to have other goals; even if no objective truth ex-
ists, it might be morally best for historians to maintain a respectful
and nonexploitative attitude toward their materials. In this section, I
will explore this normative question about historians, with respect to
both their usual scholarly work and their occasional role in litigation.
A. Taking the Past Seriously
The debate about historical objectivity provides three powerful
arguments for the objectivity norm. By this I mean not only the
knowledge of brute facts-"Elvis is dead," in terms of the epigraph to
this Article-but also the possibility of understanding and interpret-
ing past events in a meaningful way. (For instance: "Elvis adopted
109. BERKHOFER, supra note 108, at 139.
110. WHITE, supra note 108, at 81.
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black musical styles.")
The first reason for taking the past seriously is the continuing
.power it exerts in the present. One form of this power is concrete:
the ability of the past to provide new evidence, which can upset our
conclusions. This power has been emphasized by Charles Nesson in
evidence law," ' and by historians who note the possibility that addi-
tional evidence can always turn up to confound one's thesis:
What stays on visibly in the present are the physical traces from
past living-the materials or objects that historians turn into evi-
dence when they begin asking questions.... Some of this physical
residue lies forgotten, but close enough to the surface of life to be
unexpectedly happened upon. Then like hastily buried treasure or
poorly planned land mines they deliver great surprises .... The
past cannot impose its truths upon the historian, but because the
past is constantly generating its own material remains, it can and
does constrain those who seek to find out what once took place.
11 2
The best way to guard against this possibility is to produce interpreta-
tions that have the best chance of corresponding to any new evidence
that might arise.
Indeed, the need to guard against this kind of "surprise" may be
even more pressing in the judicial setting than in scholarship. As one
commentator explains, "[b]ecause the judgments of courts (when
tackling conventional legal questions) acquire greater fixity than
those of historians, it is that much more embarrassing for judges-
and threatening to the law's legitimacy-when judicial decisions em-
bodying historical interpretations fail to stand 'the test of time."'11 3
Thus, "[b]ecause our expectations of closure are greater, we are more
disappointed when they are frustrated."" 4 The need to guard against
surprises seems especially great in the context of the more important
and publicized cases. Thus, in trials with historical significance, when
newly discovered evidence results in a pardon or new trial-as it did
in some trials for mass murders by government officials in Germany,
111. See Charles Nesson, The Evidence Or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Ac-
ceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1372-75 (1985). However, Nesson argua-
bly drew the wrong conclusion from this observation. See Roger Park, The Hearsay Rule
and the Stability of Verdicts: A Response to Professor Nesson, 70 MINN. L. REV. 1057
(1986).
112. APPLEBY ET AL., supra note 90, at 255.
113. Mark J. Osiel, Ever Again: Legal Remembrance of Administrative Massacre, 144




Japan, and Argentina-the public perception is of a "political repu-
diation of a judicial foray into historiography and national narra-
tive. ' 15 The possibility of new evidence provides an incentive for
thoroughness and objectivity.
The past also exerts power in the present as the hidden cause of
current views and institutions. As Martha Nussbaum argued in con-
nection with her testimony in the Romer case, plumbing the past may
help provide us with emancipatory possibilities in the present' 6 --but
only, of course, if we correctly understand the past and its grip on the
present. For example, knowing that some same-sex relationships
were sanctioned by the medieval church may make gay marriage
seem more imaginable as a social policy today.'17
We must attend to the past carefully, then, much as we attend to
our own memories. Indeed, as with memories, one risk is that if we
shut off the past, we diminish our own selves in the present. As Ian
Hacking states, in discussing the suppression of memories of child-
hood abuse, "[w]e desperately need Aristotle's awareness that if I
misrepresent my past it matters to my sense of who I am and what I
am doing. It matters to how I live and how I feel about my life."
' 1 8
Thus, for example, one element in the definition of fundamental con-
stitutional rights has been the "traditions of our people," a recogni-
tion that our present values gain vitality from their linkage with the
past." '9 It was this linkage that motivated the historians' brief in the
abortion case.
The linkage between past and present is especially central in law.
A famous maxim by Holmes declares that the life of the law is not
logic but experience. 2 ° In this respect, Holmes was echoing the his-
torical school of jurisprudence, which stressed the connection be-
tween law and collective experience.' Jurists such as Savigny were
115. Seeid.at631.
116. See Nussbaum, supra note 21, at 1597-1601. See also Robert Gordon, The Past as
Social Criteria: Stabilizing and Destabilizing Functions of History in Legal Argument. in
THE HISTORIC TURN IN HUMAN SCIENCES 339, 359-63 (Terrence J. McDonald ed.,
1996).
117. See generally WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME SEX MARRIAGE:
FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT (1996).
118. Ian Hacking, Aristotle Meets Incest-and Innocence, in QUESTIONS OF
EVIDENCE. supra note 2. at 477.
119. See Washington v. Gluckesberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258,2260-68 (1997).
120. OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1891).
121. See Harold J. Berman, Toward an Integrative Jurisprudence: Politics, Morality,
History. 76 CAL. L. REV. 779, 789-92 (1988).
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influenced by Burke's "conception of the nation as a partnership of
the generations in time"; both Savigny and Burke "considered law to
be an integral part of the common consciousness of the nation."'"
Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment can only be understood as a
simultaneous repudiation of some traditions (represented by Dred
Scott) and a revitalization of others (represented by the Declaration
of Independence). Without this rooting in history, legal interpreta-
tion can become unmoored. 24 Thus, the claims of the past loom es-
pecially large in legal and constitutional history.
A final reason to look unblinkingly at the past relates to moral
responsibility. To confront the past is the first step in taking respon-
sibility for it and for the present. It is no coincidence that one step in
the collapse of totalitarian regimes has been the recovery of sup-
pressed histories."z In these circumstances, historical objectivity can
be profoundly liberating, while the doctrine of the social construction
of reality can mask political tyranny.126 As Milan Kundera has said,
"the struggle of a people against power is the struggle of memory
against forgetting."127
For all these reasons, it would be a mistake to abandon the goal
of objectivity. There are limits, however, to the degree of objective
truth we can expect to attain. When we seek to interpret documents,
ascribe causes, assign probabilities, or reconstruct cultures, we be-
come involved in a complex web of fact and theory, making the es-
tablishment of a definitive answer more problematic.'28 For instance,
the question of whether a group of Native Americans constitutes a
122. See id. at 789. For further discussion of the historical school, see William Ewald,
Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was it Like to Try a Rat?, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1889,
2004-42 (1995).
123. See DANIEL FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION (1989).
124. Historical jurisprudence emphasizes the relationship between law and tradition,
but while this relationship is always important, it may be one of rejection rather than ac-
ceptance. For instance, German legal thinkers explicitly connect important constitutional
rulings with the specific need of Germany to repudiate the inheritance of the Third Reich.
See Berman, supra note 121, at 791 & n.30.
125. See Osiel, supra note 113.
126. See Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The 200,000 Cards of Dimitri Yurasov:
Further Reflections on Scholarship and Truth, 46 STAN. L. REV. 647, 654-55, 661-62
(1994).
127. See APPLEBY ET AL., supra note 90, at 270.
128. Mark Kelman makes this point regarding past ascriptions of probability. See
Mark Kelman, A Rejoinder to Cass Sunstein, in QUESTIONS OF EVIDENCE, supra note 2,
at 200.
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"tribe" is not just a question about the occurrence of past events but
about how those events should be characterized legally, a determina-
tion that involves profound (and conflicting) cultural norms.129 The
same is true when we are attempting to reconstruct the collective in-
tentions of past authors or actors. After all, intent (particularly col-
lective intent) is as much a construct as a fact.13
B. Truth and the Purpose of Litigation
The values served by this kind of commitment to objectivity are
illustrated by the Chippewa case with which we began. Taking seri-
ously the history of the Chippewa and their nineteenth century inter-
actions with whites is a way of respecting them; unsentimentally at-
tempting to reconstruct their views gives them a voice and their
descendants a chance to vindicate their rights. It is also a way in
which the non-Native American majority can take moral responsibil-
ity for the painful history of the conquest and its aftermath. Still, we
must acknowledge that the original participants can no longer be in-
terrogated; moreover, their culture has been irremediably changed
over the course of 150 years, making their original culture partially
inaccessible today even to their descendants. When we seek to re-
construct their views we must speak with humility, knowing that an
irreducible element of mystery may remain. That is also a way of re-
specting them and taking responsibility for our own role in partially
erasing their culture and history.
In using the Chippewa case as an example of taking history seri-
ously, I am assuming that the judicial system, like the historian,
should have the goal of seeking the truth about the past. Whether
the historian's objectivity-or lack thereof-is important in the trial
context thus depends on a broader question: whether the primary
purpose of the trial is to establish the truth or instead to achieve
some other social goal.
The assumption that the trial's purpose is finding the truth will
not startle evidence scholars. Postmodernism so far has had only a
129. See Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, Translating Yonnondio by Precedent and
Evidence: The Mashpee Indiana Case, 1990 DUKE L.J. 625.
130. This is a major theme of the voluminous literature on legislative intent in the
statutory realm and original intent in the constitutional realm. See DANIEL FARBER &
PHILIP FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991) (statu-
tory interpretation); FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 123, at 373-97.
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small presence in evidence law.' As Twining has pointed out, the
overwhelming tradition is one of rationalism and empiricism.'32 In-
deed, as he puts it, the tradition is "remarkably unskeptical [philo-
sophically] in respect of its basic assumptions," ' although some dis-
senting voices are now beginning to emerge.'34
Quite apart from such skeptical or relativist philosophical views,
however, some notable scholars argue that the goal of the trial should
be something besides identifying truth. One view is that the trial is
primarily a form of theater designed to serve various social pur-
poses. 35 Another view is that the verdict's actual truth is less impor-
tant than its acceptance by the public as a version of past events.
36
While these theories do not reject the possibility of objective truth,
they marginalize it as a goal of adjudication. Although at this point I
am prepared to make only a preliminary assessment of these theo-
ries, I do not find them normatively attractive.
Kenneth Graham presents the theatrical perspective on trials.
He castigates inductive logic as a tool of government power, and
views trials as exercises of theater rather than fact-finding. "If we
understand that a trial is no more rational than a Presidential elec-
tion," he says, "scholars as well as lawyers can learn from the uses to
which evidence, science, and art are put by those who stage our elec-
toral extravaganzas.' ' 37 It would be fruitless to deny the existence of
a theatrical element in trials. Suffice it to say, however, that recent
Presidential elections do not seem a promising source of inspiration
for improving the trial process. Moreover, by undermining concern
about whatever had actually happened outside of the courtroom (we
are just presenting a drama, after all), Graham's theory conspicu-
131. See Roger Park, Evidence Scholarship, Old and New, 75 MINN. L. REv. 849, 849-
50 (1991).
132. See TWINING, supra note 2, at 71-81.
133. See id. at 75. Bentham and Wigmore are the paradigm examples. See id. at 38-
40,59-61.
134. See id. at 76, 110-111. For a more recent example, see Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsis-
tent Stories, 81 GEo. LJ. 2475, 2521 (1993) (whether testimony is true or false is an inter-
pretative act); see also id. at 2477-78 (finding it unproblematic for different stories to con-
tradict each other). But as Twining points out, the view that truth is merely socially
constructed has little appeal in this context, where it would block claims that the result of
a trial was ever factually wrong. See TWINING, supra note 2, at 116, 261 n.148.
135. See Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., "There'll Always Be An England": The Instrumen-
tal Ideology of Evidence, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1204, 1233-34 (1987).
136. See Nesson, supra note 111.
137. See Graham, supra note 135, at 1233-34.
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ously fails to treat the past with respect. In the Chippewa case, for
example, it suggests that we should be indifferent to the actual treat-
ment of the Chippewa in the nineteenth century; the only question is
whether the tribe or the state government can put on a more riveting
show in the courtroom today.138
The public acceptability approach is more nuanced, though it
also highlights public appraisal of the trial rather than the ascertain-
ment of truth. Charles Nesson maintains that the public needs to be
convinced that trial outcomes are tied to actual events rather than
being statements about the weight of the evidence at the trial.'39
From this premise, he draws the conclusion that the verdict should
be based, or at least should appear to be based, on acceptance of a
specific story about the events. For this reason, we should be willing
to approve civil verdicts even if they are probably false, so long as no
single opposing story is more credible than the verdict. 4 ' Unlike
Graham's theory, Nesson's theory does not cut off concern about
past events entirely, but it more subtly distorts appraisal of the past.
In order to create the public appearance of fidelity to the past, the
acceptability theory is willing to sacrifice the actual fidelity of the
verdict to the past. For this reason, the theory has been rejected by
the majority of evidence scholars.'4
A recent article by Mark Osiel explores the tension between
truth-finding and the "symbolic" functions of trials.'42 Osiel provides
detailed case studies of Nuremberg and other criminal trials of gov-
ernment leaders. His examples include the Japanese war crime trials
after World War II, the Eichman trial in Jerusalem, the Klaus Barbie
case in France, and Argentinean trials of military officers for mass
murder. Osiel believes that such trials can play a valuable role in fos-
tering public discussion,' but worries that efforts to exploit the trials
for their dramatic potential are inconsistent with due process: "What
makes for a good 'morality play' does not necessarily make for a fair
138. The history of the term "show trial" suggests that the vision of trial-as-theater is
not, in the end, a favorable one for defendants or the public.
139. Apparently, that is, when a defendant is acquitted, the public is supposed to think
he is innocent, not merely that the government failed to prove its case.
140. See Nesson, supra note 111, at 1389.
141. See Michael L. Seigel, A Pragmatic Critique of Modern Evidence Scholarship, 88
Nw. L. REV. 995, 1005 (1994).
142. See Osiel, supra note 113.
143. See id. at 498-99.
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trial."" ' Thus, he says, it is a key question "whether collective mem-
ory may be purchased only at the exorbitant price of fairness to indi-
vidual defendants."145 He concludes ultimately that properly con-
ducted trials of government leaders can serve an important
educational function. He argues, however, that their proper function
is to stimulate public discourse rather than inculcate specific lessons,
and that serving this function is consistent with fairness to defen-
dants.146 While conventional evidence scholarship has recognized the
multiple purposes of trial, it is difficult to see how we can abandon
the truth-finding function without fatally compromising the concept
of due process.
If the trial is to serve as a forum for the pursuit of truth regard-
ing past events, certain kinds of institutional conditions are required
to ensure that all the evidence is considered and that possible sources
of bias or error are exposed. These institutional conditions are em-
bodied in evidence law, rules of procedure, and standards of legal
ethics.
Similarly, certain kinds of institutional conditions are required to
underwrite the historian's testimony. Joyce Appleby and her co-
authors have written about the role of professional practices in mak-
ing objective knowledge possible. They claim that because inquiry is
an essentially social activity, the "system of peer review, open refe-
reeing, public disputation, replicated experiments, and documented
research-all aided by international communication and the ex-
tended freedom from censorship-makes objective knowledge possi-
ble.
'147
144. See id. at 505.
145. See iL at 510.
146. See id. at 700-04.
147. APPLEBY ET AL., supra note 90, at 281. Appleby's view has close affinities with
John Dewey's conception of democracy. Democracy, for Dewey, offered the only possi-
bility for the full application of human intelligence to understanding the world, because
only democratic institutions offer the full potential for criticism, experimentation, and
free debate. Unless institutions are truly democratic, open, and inclusive, they risk ex-
cluding relevant insights from the debate. See Daniel Farber, Reinventing Brandeis: Legal
Pragmatism for the Twenty-First Century, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 163, 186 (1995). On the
status of "facts" in pragmatist thought, see BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, REALISTIC SocIo-
LEGAL THEORY: PRAGMATISM AND A SOCIAL THEORY OF LAW 50-55 (1997). Thus, the
notion of objectivity need not rest on the kind of essentialist "realism" popular among
some conservatives. See Fred Matthews, The Attack on "Historicism": Allan Bloom's In-




Interestingly enough, the Supreme Court has identified some-
what similar criteria as the foundation for the presentation of scien-
tific testimony. 148 In deciding whether to admit expert testimony, the
trial judge is supposed to determine whether the evidence is based on
the scientific method. 149 This determination is to be based on several
factors, including the following:
1. Whether the theory has been tested. 5 °
2. Whether it has been subject to peer review and publication.
3. The general acceptance of the theory in the scientific commu-
nity.
The Court also stressed the availability of vigorous cross-
examination and presentation of contrary evidence as ways to pre-
vent undue reliance on shaky scientific evidence. 52  In short, the
willingness to submit evidence to open debate and testing, both in the
courtroom and in the scientific community, is central to establishing
its reliability. Although the Daubert test may not directly apply to
the testimony of historians,'53 it dovetails well with the conditions
that Appleby and others have identified for the development of
genuine historical truth.
The greatest threat to the development of such truth may not be
theories of relativism, but rather social impediments to free inquiry.
148. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
149. See id. at 589-90.
150. See id. at 593. Admittedly, the Court's discussion of this point seems as much
positivist as pragmatist.
151. Seeid.at594.
152. See id. at 596.
153. The application of Daubert to historians' testimony is unclear for two reasons.
First, the Daubert Court was addressing the specific issues posed by "scientific" testi-
mony. Much of what the Court said seems inapplicable to some other kinds of experts,
for example, testimony by real estate appraisers. Historians may or may not be -'scien-
tists" for this purpose, and if they are not, their testimony is probably subject only to
looser admissibility rules. For discussion of the application of Daubert to the social sci-
ences, see Edward Imwinkelried, The Next Step After Daubert: Developing a Similarly
Epistemological Approach to Ensuring the Reliability of Nonscientific Expert Testimony.
15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2271 (1994); Teresa Renaker, Comment, Evidentiary Legerdemain:
Deciding When Daubert Should Apply to Social Science Evidence, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1657
(1996). Second, as in the abortion case, historians sometimes give their views with regard
to an issue of "legislative" rather than "adjudicative" fact-that is, testimony relating to
some general issue of social policy rather than the factual dispute in a particular case.
Whether given orally or in writing, material pertaining to legislative facts is not subject to
the rules of evidence. As the Chippewa case illustrates. however, not all testimony by his-
torians is of this kind.
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In this regard, the Rosenberg episode discussed in Part I is particu-
larly worrisome. If historians cannot feel free, both in the courtroom
and in scholarly forums, to express their viewpoints freely, their col-
lective claim to speak the truth about the past is imperiled. Aca-
demic freedom is a necessary part of the collective search for truth.
Conclusion
In this paper, using the example of the historian as expert wit-
ness, I have attempted to explore at least preliminarily some of the
perplexities of the idea of objective truth as applied to the past. It is
tempting to brush aside relativist or skeptical theories, postmodern or
otherwise. After all, it is difficult to doubt the objective reality of
yesterday's bike accident while hobbling on crutches today. But
skepticism serves the useful purpose of focusing our attention on our
relationship with the past, rather than allowing us to take it for
granted. If we ponder the reasons why the past is not just real but
important to us, we can gain a deeper understanding of how to design
institutions and procedures for investigating the past. The basic an-
swers are familiar, having been worked out in the course of several
centuries of evolution toward a free society. It is never a mistake,
however, to recall the importance of those preconditions of free in-
quiry, whether in the academy or the courtroom.
At heart, the postmodernist claim is that abandoning the concept
of objectivity will be politically liberating-that, as Hayden White
says in the statement quoted earlier, objectivity is a barrier in the
path of the downtrodden of the earth.' As I have made clear be-
fore, I am skeptical of this claim.55 On the contrary, the first demand
of the liberated is for the truth. As Mark Osiel explains:
There is something about large-scale administrative massacre that
brings out the residual positivist-sometimes deeply "repressed," as
within postmodernist intellectuals-in virtually everyone. Before
there is any debate about who is morally or legally responsible for
what, or about which lessons must be learned to prevent the catas-
trophe's recurrence, people want to know "the facts." The banners
they proclaim through the streets might just as well carry the motto
of the nineteenth-century Germany historian, Leopold von Ranke:
to discover the past "as it really was"-a view today treated as only
154. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
155. See Farber & Sherry, supra note 126.
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the object of ridicule by professional historians.
56
The moment that the totalitarian shadow is lifted, the demand
for historical truth begins. Thus, the "first indispensable reparation
demanded by society after fundamental institutions had been re-
stored," according to the Argentine National Commission on the
Disappeared, "was to ascertain the truth of what had happened, to
'face up' to the immediate past and let the country judge."'
' 57
In sum, as Osiel says, "[d]uring democratic transitions, people
view the facts-in all their unmediated pretheoretical innocence-as
the surest antidote to the flatulent rhetoric, glittering slogans, and ra-
diant abstractions of the authoritarian rulers, recently displaced." '58
The traditional historian and conventional evidence scholar, far from
being apologists for an oppressive status quo, can justly claim to rep-
resent the forces of liberation, whereas postmodernism can some-
times serve as an evasion of responsibility for oppression."'
156. See Osiel, supra note 113, at 670.
157. Id. at 670-71.
158. Id. at 672.
159. A notable example was the use of postmodernist rhetoric by the defense in the
Klaus Barbie case. See ALAIN FINKIELKRAUT, REMEMBERING IN VAIN: THE KLAUS
BARBIE TRIAL AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (Roxanne Lapidus & Sima Godfrey
trans., 1992); Guyora Binder, Representing Nazism: Advocacy and Identity at the Trial of
Klaus Barbie, 98 YALE L.J. 1321 (1989). It seems not entirely unfair to point out that one
of the founders of postmodernist philosophy in America spent his entire life concealing
his activities as a Nazi collaborator during World War II, and that another founder de-
voted considerable effort to "deconstructing away" those anti-Semitic activities. See id. at
1377-83. Note, incidentally, Hayden White's admission that his preferred perspective on
history is "conventionally associated with the ideologies of fascist regimes." See WHITE.
supra note 108. at 74.
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